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Playing the Mysterious 
Game of Online Love: 
Examining an Emerging Trend of 
Limiting § 230 Immunity of the 
Communications Decency Act and 
the Effects on E-Dating Websites 
 
Matthew Altenberg* 
 
“If I would like to make myself seem more attractive to the 
opposite sex . . . I don’t go and get a new haircut, I update my 
profile. That’s just the way it is, you know.”1 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Online dating has proliferated in America, making it 
statistically more likely that a single adult American will find 
their future mate online than in a bar, work, or school.2 In the 
United States alone, over fifteen hundred dating social-lifestyle 
websites exist, attracting over twenty-five million users per 
month.3 Worldwide, that number soars to over 122 million 
 
  *J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law. 
1. He’s Just Not That Into You Script – Dialogue Transcript, SCRIPT-O-
RAMA.COM, http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/h/hes-just-not-that-
into-you-script.html (last visited June 9, 2012). 
2. See Michael J. Rosenfeld, How Couples Meet and Stay Together, 
STANFORD UNIV. SSDS SOCIAL SCI. DATA COLLECTION (Sept. 22, 2009, 7:02 
AM), http://data.stanford.edu/hcmst (reporting findings of studies of how 
Americans meet their spouses showing that the Internet has become the 
predominant source of how people initially meet); see also Cristen Conger, 5 
Fundamental Truths of Online Dating, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2011, 4:40 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cristen-conger/online-dating-
facts_b_823816.html (describing Stanford University survey data). 
3. See Julie Spira, The Business of Love, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 
2011, 4:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-spira/the-business-of-
love_b_885780.html (citing the number of dating websites and monthly users, 
and concluding that online dating is a lucrative emerging business in 
1
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users who log onto dating websites monthly.4 Given these 
statistics, many issues arise concerning e-dating legitimacy, 
safety, and reliability.5 
Online dating websites exist on the ever-evolving Internet, 
which consists of privately owned servers that facilitate e-
media platforms like Match.com.6 These privately owned 
websites are some of the intermediaries to which § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act provides immunity concerning 
third-party speech on their services.7 Section 230 has provided 
clarity for online intermediaries, while “[stopping] judicial 
attempts to adapt the common law” to the rapidly developing 
world of e-media platforms on the Internet.8 
This Comment argues that limiting the application of § 230 
into a narrower shield of immunity, rather than a broad 
blanket shield, is consistent with the legislative intent 
underlying § 230. Part II provides a background of 
intermediaries, both in the traditional sense and in the twenty-
first century Internet-based sense. Part III outlines the 
 
America); see also Mark Brooks, How Has Online Internet Dating Changed 
Society?, ONLINE PERSONALS WATCH (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.onlinepersonalswatch.com/files/idea-white-paper-final-review-
copy-only-updated-1-19-2.pdf (describing the number of worldwide users of 
Internet dating websites and the increase in monthly users). 
4. See generally Brooks, supra note 3 (reporting increase in worldwide 
users of Internet dating websites). 
5. See Conger, supra note 2, at pt. 2 (explaining that Internet dating 
profiles are “riddled with white lies” and users must approach Internet 
dating like interviews because of safety concerns); see also Online Dating 
Sites Sued For Fraud, SAVVY INSIDER (Sept. 7, 2011, 7:05 PM), 
http://www.savvyinsider.com/article.php?op=viewArticle&article_ID=427. 
6. See Fredrick Oduol Oduor, The Internet and Copyright Protection: Are 
We Producing a Global Generation of Copyright Criminals?, 18 VILL. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 501, 502 (2011) (noting how the Internet has “changed several 
perceptions” concerning how people conduct “personal . . . affairs” in their 
lives, which has led to “depersonalization”). See generally David S. Ardia, 
Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 382-83 (2010) (describing Internet servers and 
e-media platforms and how they interact with each other). 
7. See Ardia, supra note 6, at 411 (outlining what Internet 
intermediaries may claim under § 230 immunity). 
8. See id. (noting that § 230 has been very useful in developing clear 
guidelines to online intermediaries concerning liability, which common law 
principles failed to do). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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constitutional framework concerning free speech and 
intermediaries. Part IV explains the development and 
application of § 230. Additionally, Part IV introduces new case 
law that represents the emerging trend of limiting § 230 
immunity. Part V analyzes two significant cases that establish 
this trend. Additionally, Part V argues that a limited § 230 
immunity application is within the proper scope of 
congressional findings and purpose set-forth in § 230. Finally, 
Part VI concludes by examining the impact the emerging trend 
will have on e-dating and other lifestyle social networking 
websites. 
 
II. Background Of Intermediaries 
 
The Internet is a network of networks.9 The networks on 
the Internet incorporate various electronic links, each of which 
originate from a user and connect to a server, to a router, and 
ultimately to an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).10 The 
Internet user relies upon electronic links or organizational 
directories, like the Google search-engine, to find specific 
information from an endless amount of stored data.11 These 
links between speaker and listener make up Internet 
intermediaries, which range from search engines to private 
websites.12 The legal definition of an intermediary is “[a] 
mediator or go-between; a third- party negotiator.”13 
Additionally, an online intermediary is defined as any entity 
that enables the communication of information or data from 
one user to another user.14 
 
9. See generally Seth Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First 
Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 16 (2006) (explaining the background of the Internet 
and how networks developed within it). 
10. Kreimer, supra note 9, at 17-20. 
11. Id. at 18 (highlighting the process of data storage on the Internet 
and how users rely on organizational directories to find specific data or 
websites). 
12. See generally Ardia, supra note 6, at 385-87 (discussing various types 
of Internet intermediaries, which include communication conduits, content 
host, and search/application providers). 
13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 890 (9th ed. 2009). 
14. See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 6, at 385 (noting differences between 
3
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The development of communication intermediaries began 
in the eighteenth century, when the optical telegraph 
transmitted messages across Europe.15 Following the optical 
telegraph, the electric telegraph, which was termed the 
“Victorian Internet,” revolutionized how humans 
communicated.16 Through this historical development, private 
online intermediaries emerged by a communication process of 
common languages called the Transfer Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (“TCP/IP”), which allows computers 
running on different operating systems to communicate with 
each other.17 
Today, these interconnected networks create a variety of 
platforms for speech and press, which include e-dating 
websites, social networking websites, photo-hosting services, 
and blogs.18 Although the Internet has no central authority, the 
decentralized structure has led to the proliferation of the 
Internet as a communication tool.19 Due to the decentralized 
structure, private intermediaries have flourished in the 
“industrial information economy,” which provides users with a 
wide range of communication possibilities, including e-dating.20 
 
traditional intermediaries and online intermediaries). 
15. See TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE 
STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS 
12 (1998) (discussing historical background of the telegraph and the 
development of communication through electronic means). 
16. Id. at 16. 
17. See generally Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers 
Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 
821 (2004). 
18. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1116 (2005) (detailing a vast amount of private 
entities on the Internet that are under the U.S. Constitution’s free speech 
protection); see also Yang-Ming Tham, Comment, Honest to Blog: Balancing 
the Interests of Public Figures and Anonymous Bloggers in Defamation 
Lawsuits, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 229, 234 (2010) (noting the difficulty 
in classifying online blogs as writings or free press because online blogs are a 
“recent innovation”). 
19. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933, 936-39 (2008) (describing the importance of the 
Internet as a communication tool and how its decentralized structure has 
allowed exponential growth of Internet intermediaries). 
20. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 32 (2006), available at 
http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf (explaining how 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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A. Intermediary Classifications 
 
The functions of e-intermediaries are not as 
straightforward as traditional intermediaries, and the 
illustration below highlights the role that various 
intermediaries play when an Internet user requests data.21 
When an Internet user requests a profile page from an e-dating 
website, the profile page request is sent from the original user’s 
computer to a computer network run by an ISP.22 Next, the ISP 
sends the profile data request via multiple intermediaries 
owned by the ISP that enable peering connections to that 
person’s network.23 From this point, the data is sent from the e-
dating websites server, which hosts the profile data, to the 
original user who sent the data request.24 From this example, 
intermediaries can be grouped into three categories, each 
discussed below: 1) Communication Conduits; 2) 
Search/Application Providers; and 3) Content Hosts.25 
 
 
 
 
 
the “industrial information economy” has transformed the global landscape 
regarding how communication is transferred and how private intermediaries 
have played a central role in this transformation); see also Steven Masur, 
Collective Rights Licensing for Internet Downloads and Streams: Would it 
Properly Compensate Rights Holders?, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39, 39-40 
(2011) (highlighting how the Internet has changed business models 
concerning digital media rights and noting that copyright law had to be 
reexamined due to the proliferation of Internet intermediaries allowing 
consumers to download music online). See generally Solum & Chung, supra 
note 17, at 847-49. 
21. See Ardia, supra note 6, at 386 (examining the process an 
intermediary plays when users request data from private websites and how 
different intermediaries are required when one Internet user requests data). 
22. See id. at 386-87. 
23. See generally Paul Milgrom et al., Competitive Effects of Internet 
Peering Policies, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL: RAISING QUESTIONS, SEEKING 
ANSWERS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 175, 175-80 (Ingo Vogelsang & 
Benjamin Compaine eds., 2000) (describing “peering connections” as a 
process in which neither party pays for content exchanged between ISPs—
instead the ISP collects revenue from the original user). 
24. See Ardia, supra note 6, at 386-87. 
25. See id. at 387. 
5
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1. Communication Conduits 
 
First, communication conduits are intermediaries that 
facilitate the transportation of data across an Internet 
network.26 This type of intermediary takes the form of an 
Internet provider, which is usually provided through a 
telephone, cable, or satellite company.27 The Internet provider 
allows users to access the Internet, and most Internet 
providers have a contractual relationship with the user who 
pays for Internet service.28 In comparison to traditional 
intermediaries, content intermediaries may be analogized to 
newspaper delivery people or telephone companies that deliver 
voice traffic.29 Finally, communication conduits do not have 
direct knowledge of the data they are transporting—thus, their 
primary role is the transportation of the requested data.30 
 
2. Application and Search Providers 
 
Second, application and search providers are 
intermediaries that provide access to Internet data by 
organizing and filtering the data.31 Application and search 
provider intermediaries enable Internet users to find specific 
data from an endless amount of data available on the 
Internet.32 Two examples of application and search provider 
intermediaries are the Google and Yahoo search engines.33 In 
comparison to traditional intermediaries, application and 
search provider intermediaries may be analogized to a 
 
26. See id. at 386-87. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. (noting that ISPs are one type of intermediary involved in the 
process when a user requests data on the Internet). 
29. See id. (comparing communication conduits to traditional 
intermediaries to illustrate the complexity of e-intermediaries). 
30. See id. 
31. See id. at 389. 
32. See id. (noting the importance that application and search provider 
intermediaries play, because the amount of data available online is massive 
and organization of that data enables users to filter out data that they are 
looking for). 
33. See id. at 388. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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telephone directory or a stock price index.34 
 
3. Content Hosts 
 
Third, content host intermediaries store, cache, and 
provide access to third-party content.35 Content host 
intermediaries are primarily privately owned websites.36 For 
example, when group users gather on Match.com to find a 
potential mate, Match.com plays host to third party speech 
through the terms and conditions set-forth by Match.com.37 In 
comparison to traditional intermediaries, content hosts may be 
analogized to book stores or libraries.38 This Comment will 
focus on content hosts in examining the effects of a narrower § 
230 immunity. 
 
B. Liability of Intermediaries 
 
Traditionally, intermediaries are not liable as primary 
malfeasors, however, they may be liable through secondary 
liability.39 Primary liability arises from the original speaker, 
and secondary liability arises from an actor that has a nexus to 
the original speaker.40 Typically, online intermediaries have 
 
34. See id. at 389. 
35. See id. at 387. 
36. See id. at 387-88 (stating that servers owned by private companies 
enable the storage of third party content and that this type of intermediary 
makes up the most commonly thought-of Internet intermediary). 
37. See id. (citing examples of content host intermediaries such as 
Facebook.com, Flickr.com, and Youtube.com). 
38. See id. at 388-89 (describing offline distributor intermediaries as 
similar to content hosts, in that they facilitate third party speech distribution 
to reach a broad audience). 
39. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-81 (1964) (holding 
that the intermediary of a newspaper was safeguarded by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action against a public official); Gershwin 
Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (2d Cir. 
1971) (vicarious liability and contributory liability, in the intellectual 
property context, applies when a party with knowledge of infringing activity 
induces or causes the infringing conduct of another). See generally Assaf 
Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 912-16 
(2002). 
40. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162-63 (defining 
contributory liability, within the intellectual property field, as having 
7
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various legal protections, like § 230 immunity, which protects 
online intermediaries from secondary liability, unless they act 
in a manner indicating that they “knew or should have known” 
about the illegal action.41 Additionally, § 230 excludes 
intellectual property law, federal criminal law, and 
communications privacy law.42 Therefore, the main form of 
liability relevant to intermediaries that fall outside of § 230 
immunity are speech based torts, such as misrepresentation or 
defamation.43 
Generally, content hosts are not liable for the content they 
provide to other users unless they have “knowledge” that it is 
illegal.44 When a content host intermediary gains “knowledge” 
that the data or material it is distributing is illegal in nature, it 
is required to stop making the data available, or it will face 
liability.45 This type of “knowledge” may be defamatory on its 
face, or inferred from past actions.46 However, if a content host 
intermediary is under a duty to the public to accept and 
transmit messages, then knowledge alone is insufficient to 
 
knowledge of infringing activity or materially contributing to infringing 
conduct); Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(explaining that § 230 immunity did not absolve Yahoo! from liability when it 
deliberately and intentionally created false profiles for the purpose of luring 
clients to renewing subscriptions on e-dating service). See generally Reinier 
H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 
93 YALE L.J. 857, 889-93 (1984) (discussing the act of aiding and abetting as 
an act creating secondary liability in criminal law, where intermediaries are 
not required to act affirmatively, but must only act not to aid a known illegal 
act). 
41. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162 (explaining that 
liability may arise when the intermediary knew that the content was illegal). 
42. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2006) (listing the types of law not included within 
§ 230 immunity). 
43. See Hamdani, supra note 39, at 916 (noting that the main forms of 
liability concerning § 230 lawsuits are libel, defamation, and 
misrepresentation). 
44. See Tacket v. Gen. Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042, 1046 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984); Dworkin v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Wyo. 1986) (“[O]ne who 
only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is 
subject to liability if . . . he knows or had reason to know of its defamatory 
character.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977)). 
45. See Dworkin, 634 F. Supp. at 729. 
46. See Tacket, 836 F.2d at 1046. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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establish liability.47 Thus, a content host intermediary assumes 
the sender is privileged unless it has an affirmative reason to 
know of information to the contrary.48 Therefore, content host 
intermediaries not classified as a “public utility” are afforded 
the standard of “know or have reason to know” of a 
misrepresentation or falsity.49 
 
III. Constitutional Framework of First Amendment 
Protections 
 
In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court established a 
background for evaluating sanctions on intermediaries,50 and 
as Seth Kreimer notes “[t]hese doctrines continue to frame the 
rights of litigants in modern litigation over efforts . . . of 
Internet communications . . . .”51 The first two cases involved 
intermediary protection for booksellers when state statutes 
made it illegal for booksellers to sell or display obscene or 
objectionable books.52 During this time, the Supreme Court 
stated that the First Amendment does not support strict 
 
47. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-81 (1964); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 533 F.2d 601, 
608 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Dworkin, 634 F. Supp. at 729-30. 
48. See O’Brien v. W. Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 543 (1st Cir. 1940). 
49. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 993 (2005); Dworkin, 634 F. Supp. at 729. 
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 290-92 (holding that First 
Amendment protections apply to intermediaries, and that public official 
seeking damages for libel must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
defendant published statements with actual malice); Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963) (invalidating a state practice that notified 
distributors that certain magazines and books were found to be objectionable 
for display or sale on the grounds that the published items were obscene or 
indecent to minors) 
51. Kreimer, supra note 9, at 51. 
52. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151, 154 (1959) (declaring 
unconstitutional a city ordinance that made it illegal for bookstore operators 
to have obscene books on their shelves because the ordinance had “the 
collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression” and because the 
censorship effect of the ordinance through intermediaries would be 
“censorship affecting the whole public”); Bantam Books, Inc., 372 U.S. at 64 
n.6 (“The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the 
circulation of books as well as their publication . . . .” (citing Lovell v. City of 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938))). 
9
ALTENBERGMACRO 29 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:06 AM 
2012] THE MYSTERIOUS GAME OF ONLINE LOVE 931 
liability on intermediaries.53 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
the Court stated that First Amendment protections are 
afforded to the publication and distribution of speech.54 
Additionally, the Court in Bantam Books, Inc. found that acts 
and practices that “directly and designedly stopped the 
circulation of publications” have the effect of suppressing 
speech by condemning intermediaries that distribute the 
books.55 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court stated that 
the First Amendment protection extends to intermediaries.56 
Damages for defamatory speech must be “prove[n]by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant published the 
defamatory statement with actual malice . . . .”57 The Court 
noted that “‘actual malice’ . . . is, with knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 
“58 Additionally, the Court looked at New York Times Co. as a 
whole concerning “knowledge,” rather than focusing on the 
individual publisher within the New York Times Co.59 With 
this doctrinal overview of Supreme Court precedent concerning 
traditional intermediaries, § 230 may be thought of as a 
continuation of intermediary protection in the twenty-first 
century.60 
 
IV. The CDA and § 230 Immunity 
 
This Section will provide an overview of § 230, including 
the congressional history of the legislation, case law applying 
the traditional blanket immunity of § 230, and case law 
representing the emerging trend of limiting the application of § 
 
53. See Smith, 361 U.S. at 154 (finding that a city ordinance dispensing 
of the scienter-knowledge requirement for sellers of books containing obscene 
material could not stand due to First Amendment protections). 
54. Bantam Books, Inc., 372 U.S. at 72. 
55. See id. at 68 (the practice of intermediary censorship has the effect of 
suppressing speech protected by the First Amendment). 
56. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 290-92 (1964). 
57. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) 
(citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80). 
58. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280. 
59. See id. at 290-91. 
60. See Kreimer, supra note 9, at 55. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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230 immunity. Subsection A will provide an overview of the 
development of § 230. Subsection B will discuss a test courts 
have developed when determining when to apply § 230 
immunity. Subsection C will describe a variety of cases 
applying § 230 with the developed test under a blanket 
immunity application. Finally, Subsection D will explain the 
case law that represents the emerging trend that has limited 
the application of § 230 immunity. 
 
A. The Development of § 230 
 
Senator James Exon introduced an amendment attempting 
to regulate Internet speech, which later turned into the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) on February 1, 1995.61 
Senator Exon wanted to keep the Internet from becoming a 
“red light district” and he wanted to better protect families and 
children from those individuals who “cruise the digital world 
[seeking] to engage children in inappropriate communications 
and introductions.”62 According to Senator Exon the CDA was 
intended to protect children from indecency online.63 
However, after Senator Exon introduced the CDA, there 
were “strong objections from the interactive computer service 
industry.”64 The computer service industry claimed that they 
would have to screen and monitor an immense amount of data 
to protect children, which was claimed to be “an impossible 
task.”65 Thus, defenses were added to the proposed legislation 
to narrow its reach.66 Representatives Cox and Wyden, who 
 
61. See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s 
Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information 
Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 52 (1996) (describing Senator Exon’s 
intent in introducing CDA). 
62. 141 CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
James Exon). 
63. 141 CONG. REC. S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
James Exon). 
64. See Cannon, supra note 61, at 59. 
65. See id. at 59-61 (listing the defenses the computer industry 
advocated for concerning the reach of the CDA). 
66. 141 CONG. REC. S8345 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Dan Coats) ( “[I]t is the intent of this legislation that persons who are 
providing access to or connection with [the] Internet or other electronic 
service not under their control are exempted under this legislation”); see also 
11
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opposed the CDA, introduced a defense provision, which later 
became § 230 of the CDA.67 Known as the Online Family 
Empowerment Amendment, the goal of the Amendment was to 
“promote the continued development of the Internet and. . . [to] 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that exists on 
the Internet . . . .” 68 
 
B. The Completed Act with § 230 
 
The CDA, along with § 230, was passed by Congress and 
signed by former President Bill Clinton on February 8, 1996.69 
Under the heading “Protection for the ‘Good Samaritan’ 
Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material,” § 230(c)(1) of 
the CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider.”70 Although § 230(c)(1) does not explicitly state the 
 
142 CONG. REC. H1158 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Henry 
Hyde) (“[t]he conference report expressly provides an absolute legal defense 
to any on-line access provider . . . ‘solely for providing access . . . to or from a 
facility, system or network not under that person's control,’ so long as that 
person is not involved in ‘the creation of the content of the communication”’); 
142 CONG. REC. S714 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. James Exon) 
(“[C]omputer services such as CompuServe . . . that provide access to sites on 
[the] Internet which they do not control, are not liable.”); 142 CONG. REC. 
S714 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. James Exon): 
 
[T]he legislation generally does not hold liable any entity 
that acts like a common carrier without knowledge of 
messages it transmits or hold liable an entity which provides 
access to another system over which the access provider has 
no ownership of content. Just like in other pornography 
statutes, Congress does not hold the mailman liable for the 
mail that he/she delivers. 
 
Id. 
67. See 141 CONG. REC. H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
68. See id. 
69. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) 
(stating date passed by Senate, House, and signed by President); 142 CONG. 
REC. S687 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dan Coats. 
70. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). Subsection (c) states in full: 
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term “immunity,” most courts have applied the term 
“immunity” to §230(c)(1) and applied the effect of broad 
immunity.71 
After § 230 became effective, courts developed a three-
tiered test in determining whether § 230 immunity applied.72 
The first tier asks if the party claiming immunity is a “provider 
or user of an ‘interactive computer service.’”73 The second tier 
asks if the party claiming immunity is being treated as 
“publisher or speaker” of the content at issue.74 The third tier 
asks if the content at issue is “information provided by another 
 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening 
of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker: No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability: No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on account of: 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means 
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 
 
Id. § 230(c)(1), (2). 
71. See, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173-76 
(9th Cir. 2009); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); Chi. Lawyers’ 
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670-
72 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-63 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Ben Ezra Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-87 (10th 
Cir. 2000). 
72. See Zango, Inc., 568 F.3d at 1177-78; Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 
671-72; GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659-62; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162; 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that § 230(c) provides broad immunity for published content provided 
by a third party). 
73. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 F.3d at 985-86 (10th Cir. 2000). 
The definition of ICS under §230(f) is “[a]ny information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006). 
74. See Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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information content provider.”75 
Additionally, within § 230 the term “interactive computer 
service” (“ICS”) is defined as “[a]ny information service, system, 
or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server . . . .”76 The term 
“information content provider” (“ICP”) refers to “[a]ny person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
or development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.”77 Within § 230’s 
provisions, courts have relied upon congressional findings and 
the policy underlying § 230 in applying immunity broadly.78 
Additionally, critics to a narrow interpretation of § 230 have 
noted that the objectives of § 230 are to promote, preserve, and 
 
75. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). 
76. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
77. Id. § 230(f)(3). 
78. See generally Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Immunity Provisions of Communications 
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, 52 A.L.R. FED. 2D 37 (2011) (finding that courts 
have applied § 230(c) immunity in a broad-based approach). Catalano notes 
that the findings of § 230 provide for a broad degree of immunity because the 
Internet has become an integral feature of our society. See id. at 40-42 
(applying findings stated within text of the CDA). The CDA § 230 findings 
reads in full: 
 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other 
interactive computer services available to individual 
Americans represents an extraordinary advance in the 
availability of educational and informational resources to 
our citizens. 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over 
the information that they receive, as well as the potential 
for even greater control in the future as technology 
develops. 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services 
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, 
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad 
avenues for intellectual activity. 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services 
have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a 
minimum of government regulation. 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media 
for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and 
entertainment services. 
 
47 U.S.C § 230(a)(1)-(5) (2006). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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encourage the development of the Internet, which is exactly 
what a broad-based immunity provision accomplishes.79 
 
C. The Application of § 230 
 
The first Internet intermediary to be sued as an 
intermediary distributor occurred in Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe.80 In Cubby, the court relied upon the analysis in 
Smith v. California,81 and held that CompuServe was a 
distributor and could not be held liable for defamatory 
statements in its forum unless the plaintiff could prove 
CompuServe “knew or had reason to know” of defamatory 
content.82 The court looked at CompuServe’s contract with the 
third-party and the time frame in which it loaded and 
 
79. See generally Catalano, supra note 78, at 51 (describing policy 
aspects of CDA § 230 as encouraging broad-based immunity). The policy 
provisions of § 230 reads in full: 
 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet 
and other interactive computer services and other 
interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation; 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which 
maximize user control over what information is received by 
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and 
other interactive computer services; 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and 
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that 
empower parents to restrict their children’s access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws 
to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and 
harassment by means of computer. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(5) (2006). 
80. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (noting that CompuServe was treated like a distributor in the 
traditional common law doctrine); see also Anthony J. Sassan, Cubby, Inc. v. 
Compuserve, Inc.: Comparing Apples to Oranges: The Need for a New Media 
Classification, 22 SOFTWARE L.J. 820, 823 (1992). 
81. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
82. See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 139-40. 
15
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presented data onto its service in deciding that CompuServe 
was an intermediary.83 
 
1. Interactive Computer Service (“ICS”) 
 
The courts in the following cases held that the online 
entity was an ICS, thus, § 230 applied. In DiMeo v. Max,84 the 
court determined that an operator of a website that hosted an 
online message board was an ICS.85 In Cornelius v. DeLuca,86 
the court found the defendant to be an ICS because the 
defendant was required to access the Internet to exist and to be 
used by the public.87 In Barrett v. Fonorow, the court found 
that a web site operator was a provider or user of an ICS in 
which the service is a message board where authors post 
articles.88 In Donato v. Moldow, the court found that a website 
that hosted a bulletin board for the community was within the 
scope of an ICS because it used the web sites’ electronic host to 
access the Internet.89 
The courts in the following cases held that the online 
entity was not an ICS, thus, § 230 did not apply. In Novartis 
Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal 
Cruelty USA, Inc., the court determined that the website 
operator was not an ICS because the website only posted 
employee information and a calendar of events.90 In 
Huntingdon Life Science, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal 
Cruelty USA, Inc., the court held that immunity was not 
applicable because the defendant’s website simply published 
accounts of demonstrations and the website owner posted some 
newspaper articles.91 
 
83. See id. at 140 (noting the relationship that CompuServe had with the 
third party who supplied defamatory information). 
84. 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 530 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
85. See id. at 531-32. 
86. 709 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (D. Idaho 2010). 
87. Id. at 1022. 
88. See Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916, 922-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
89. See Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 718-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2005). 
90. See Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntington 
Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 39-40 (Ct. App. 2006). 
91. See Huntington Life Sci., Inc. v. Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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2. Publication 
 
The courts in the following cases held the publication 
requirement of § 230 was satisfied. In Miles v. Raycom Media, 
Inc., the court held that § 230 of the CDA required publication 
of defamatory content.92 Further, when a news article is put on 
a website which allows users to comment on the article, the 
website owner may qualify for immunity.93 Additionally, in 
Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Prudy, the court found that content 
was published when a third-party posted allegedly defamatory 
content on a website’s bulletin board, thus allowing the website 
owner to claim immunity under § 230.94 
The court in the following case held that the publication 
requirement of § 230 was not satisfied. In City of Chicago, 
Illinois v. StubHub!, Inc., the court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that a city’s amusement tax imposed on their 
website was the type of publication to which § 230 immunity 
applied.95 
 
3. Third-Party Content 
 
The courts in the following cases held that § 230 immunity 
applied because the online entity was being treated as 
publisher of third-party content. In Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., 
where an advertisement for a handgun was placed under the 
incorrect online classified service category by an unknown 
individual, the plaintiff sought to treat the merchant as a 
speaker of third-party content.96 The court held the website 
operator was immune under § 230 and stated that this is the 
 
USA, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 544 n.9 (Ct. App. 2008). 
92. See Miles v. Raycom Media, Inc., No. 09-CV-713(LG)(RHW), 2010 
WL 3419438, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 26, 2010). 
93. Id. 
94. See Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Prudy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249 (D. 
Minn. 2005). 
95. See City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 365-66 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
96. See Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08-CV-7735(RMB), 2009 WL 
1704355, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009).  
17
ALTENBERGMACRO 29 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:06 AM 
2012] THE MYSTERIOUS GAME OF ONLINE LOVE 939 
type of lawsuit § 230 was designed to immunize.97 In Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., the court found that § 230 barred tort claims 
based on misrepresentation, when the claims sought to treat an 
ICS as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.98 In 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the court found that unauthorized 
postings on a social networking website immunized the website 
owner, because the information in question was entirely 
provided by another information content provider.99 In Gentry 
v. eBay, Inc., the court concluded that an online auction 
website that misrepresented the safety of an item was immune 
under § 230, because the safety information was created by a 
third-party.100 Finally, in Doe II v. MySpace Inc., the court 
found that a tort action to treat a social networking website as 
a publisher was barred by § 230, because the profile in question 
was entirely created by a third-party.101 
However, the court in the following case held that § 230 
immunity did not apply because the content in question was 
not entirely created by a third-party. In Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 
the court found that an e-dating service was not immune 
because the service’s manner of presenting user profiles, not 
the profiles themselves, constituted fraud, therefore, the 
service provider was not immune under § 230.102 It is 
important to note that when a service provider publishes 
tortious content created solely by the ISP, this conduct falls 
outside § 230 immunity.103 In Anthony, the court found that the 
dating service in question created false profiles to induce 
members to maintain memberships with the dating website.104 
 
97. See id., at *3-4. 
98. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419-20 (5th Cir. 2008). 
99. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) . 
100. See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 711 (Ct. App. 2002). 
101. See Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 573-74 (Ct. App. 
2009). 
102. See Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d. 1257, 1262-64 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006) (explaining that the e-dating website produced fictitious profiles, 
and thus the website operator became a content provider by creating profiles 
and § 230 immunity did not apply). 
103. See id. (noting that when an ISP fully creates tortious content, 
immunity does not apply because the ISP turned into an ICP). 
104. See id. (noting that the creation of false profiles was a marketing 
strategy implemented by the ISP). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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The court clearly noted that immunity has not been extended 
when an ISP creates its own comments and other defamatory 
content, while accompanying third-party postings on its 
website.105 Therefore, an important question to ask is whether 
an ISP turned into an ICP by exceeding its editorial 
prerogatives. If the answer is yes, then the ISP § 230 immunity 
will not apply.106 
 
D. The Emerging Trend of § 230 
 
 The case law above has evolved around a broad application 
of immunity under § 230. However, recent case law has 
emerged which has limited the application of § 230 and a trend 
has developed.107 The first prominent case in this emerging 
trend is GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC.108 In GW 
Equity, the court found that a website may lose immunity 
when it takes an active role in creating or developing the 
content at issue.109 This type of heightened scrutiny of § 230 
has been classified as “mixed use” analysis.110 The second 
prominent case is Fair Housing Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC.111 The court in Roommates.com 
found that a website operator may lose immunity when the 
operator “encourages” or “contributes” to the illegal content 
published on the website.112 This type of heightened scrutiny 
has been classified as the “encouragement or solicitation of 
 
105. See Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 418 F. Supp. 2d 
1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
106. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297-98 
(D.N.H. 2008). 
107. See generally Samuel J. Morley, How Broad is Web Publisher 
Immunity Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 84 FLA. 
B.J. 8, 13 (Feb. 2010) (discussing the heightened scrutiny of § 230 immunity 
in current case law). 
108. No. 07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL 62173, *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009). 
109. See id. at 18 (finding that the defendant provided a consumer 
complaint forum that included titles, headings, and editorial messages 
written by the website operator). 
110. See Morley, supra note 107, at 14 (the new type of heightened 
scrutiny analysis applies when a website operator “significantly changes 
content to third party content”). 
111. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
112. See id. at 1167. 
19
ALTENBERGMACRO 29 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:06 AM 
2012] THE MYSTERIOUS GAME OF ONLINE LOVE 941 
illegal content analysis.”113 The third prominent case was 
Chicago Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist.114 The court in 
Craigslist did not mention the term immunity while applying § 
230 and the court stated that§ 230 of the CDA “[c]annot be 
understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for website 
operators . . . .”115 Additionally, the court explained that ISPs 
could be liable if the ISP “played a more direct ‘causal’ role in 
the creation of the information.”116 This has set the stage for 
what some legal analysts describe as an evolutionary trend in 
limiting § 230 immunity.117 
 
VI.  Analysis 
 
The concept behind the Internet has been to facilitate 
unrestricted conversations between actors with little regulation 
or oversight.118 Therefore, this environment is conditioned for 
deception, rumors, slander, and intentional misrepresentations 
involving real humans and imaginary humans.119 In analyzing 
e-dating websites and immunity, the statutory scheme of § 230 
must be plainly described.120 Section 230 provides that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.”121 Additionally, § 230 
states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of . . . any action 
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access or availability 
 
113. See Morley, supra note 107, at 14-15 (when a website owner 
requires a third party to submit or input information that “encourages” or 
“contributes” to illegal nature, immunity may not apply). 
114. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). 
115. Id. at 669. 
116. KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, Comment, "Minor" Online Sexual 
Harassment and the CDA § 230 Defense: New Directions for Internet Service 
Provider Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 207, 240 (2009). 
117. See Morley, supra note 107, at 8, 13-16. 
118. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet Service 
Provider for Internet or E-mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R.5th 169 (2000). 
119.  See generally Jeffrey R. Elkin, Cybersmears: Dealing with 
Defamation on the Net, 9 BUS. L. TODAY 22, 23 (Jan./Feb. 2000). 
120. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
121. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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of material that the provider . . . considers to be . . . 
objectionable.”122 
With the legal framework established, the analysis of the 
emerging trend of § 230 immunity will proceed in Section A 
with a narrative analysis of the case law that defines the 
emerging trend. Following Section A, Section B will provide 
critical analysis regarding the emerging trend and argue that a 
narrower § 230 application is fully consistent with the policy 
and legislative findings of § 230. 
 
A. Narrative Analysis 
 
The immunity provision of § 230 has generally been 
interpreted by courts as a complete shield on lawsuits against 
websites for disseminating third-party content.123 However, two 
recent cases have indicated that a previously limitless 
application of § 230 may be coming to an end.124 Generally, the 
broad application of § 230 immunity has been based upon 
whether ISPs act as ICPs.125 Some critics have noted that § 230 
has been turned into a “blanket immunity” that allows 
websites to leave content online that is defamatory or invasive 
of privacy.126 Thus, a trend in rethinking broad immunity has 
emerged.127 The cases of Roommates.com and Craigslist outline 
that ISPs can also be ICPs at the same time, and a closer 
examination of the “creation” or “development” of the third-
party content must be recognized.128 
 
 
 
 
122. Id. § 230(c)(2). 
123. See David L. Hudson Jr., Taming the Gossipmongers, 94 A.B.A. J. 
19, 20 (2008); see also Morley, supra note 107, at 10 (finding that courts have 
been resistant to narrowing § 230 immunity). 
124. See Hudson Jr., supra note 123, at 19. 
125. See Morley, supra note 107, at 10. 
126. Hudson Jr., supra note 123, at 19 (quoting professor of law Daniel 
Solove, George Washington University). 
127. See Morley, supra note 107, at 10. 
128. See id. at 14-15 (examining the importance of Roommates.com and 
Craigslist and the application of the ISP/ICP distinction). 
21
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1. The First Leading Case – Roommates.com 
 
In Roommates.com, the court found that a website operator 
can be an ISP and ICP at the same time.129 The court in 
Roommates.com drew a line of distinction between the two 
categories, and determined that if a website “passively 
displays” content created entirely by a third-party, then it is 
solely an ISP with respect to that content.130 However, when a 
website “creates” the content or is responsible in “whole or in 
part” for the “development” of the objectionable information, 
then the website is also an ICP.131 Thus, a website may be 
immune from liability by § 230 for some of its content, but 
liable for the content it helped create.132 The court in 
Roommates.com noted that “Congress sought to immunize the 
removal of user-generated content, not the creation of [the] 
content” by passing § 230 of the CDA.133 Thus, when an online 
user submits data on a profile page that is drawn directly from 
questions posted by an ISP, closer analysis of the objectionable 
information must be applied before granting § 230 immunity.134 
Additionally, the court in Roommates.com noted that an 
ISP may become an ICP by aiding in the development of the 
objectionable content, concerning a user’s profile.135 In defining 
“development” the court in Roommates stated: 
 
[W]e interpret the term ‘development’ as 
referring not merely to augmenting the content 
generally, but to materially contributing to its 
alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a website 
helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls 
within the exception of section 230, if it 
 
129. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that Roommates.com 
played a part in development of objectionable content). 
130. See id. at 1162-63. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at 1172 (holding defendant liable because it was an ICP for 
some of the objectionable content). 
133. Id. at 1163. 
134. See id. at 1172 n.32. 
135. Id. at 1166 n.19. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
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contributes materially to the alleged illegality of 
the conduct.136 
 
It follows from this definition that a dating website who 
asks users to enter personal information (e.g., sex, race, 
religion) through drop down menus, and allows users to search 
profiles limited to those classifications, will retain immunity.137 
Additionally, it is important to understand that ISPs are 
complex entities, but when an ISP starts to participate in the 
development process, immunity must be scrutinized at a higher 
level.138 
The court in Roommates.com noted that an ISP that allows 
users to add further comments to their profile is not 
“developing” the content.139 Therefore, the message in 
Roommates.com is that if an ISP does not “encourage illegal 
content or design a process” that requires a user to enter illegal 
content, then the ISP will retain immunity.140 For example, 
when an e-dating website provides questionnaires or hints on 
how to answer personal questions on a profile creation Internet 
page, the e-dating ISP will retain immunity as long as this 
content is fully provided by a third-party and is not illegal in 
nature.141 
Furthermore, the court in Roommates.com clarified its 
analysis in Carafano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc., which concerned 
data e-dating websites collect from users in analyzing ISP/ICP 
liability.142 The court analyzed a commercial Internet dating 
service within § 230, where an unknown person had used a 
computer in Berlin to create a dating profile without the 
knowledge or consent of the celebrity plaintiff.143 The court 
found that a typical dating profile contains pictures, descriptive 
 
136. Id. at 1167-68. 
137. See id. at 1169 (finding that when an ISP asks users for legal 
profile information, that ISP does not turn into ICP). 
138. See id. at 1170. 
139. See id. at 1174-75 (ISPs retain immunity when a user adds 
whatever they want under the “additional comments” portion of profile). 
140. Id. at 175. 
141. See id. at 1166. 
142. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
143. Id. at 1121-22. 
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information like age and interests, and answers to various 
questions created by the Internet dating website to evoke a 
deeper personality connection between users for the reason of 
paying for the service.144 In addition to the general profile data 
questions, the e-dating website involved in Carafano asked 
members to select multiple choice answers to additional 
optional questions, some of which were sexually suggestive.145 
The court analogized an Internet’s dating website profile 
classification system to that of an online auction website.146 
Accordingly, the court looked at Gentry v. eBay, Inc.,147 in 
concluding that a highly structured “Feedback Forum” that 
categorized user feedback with a color-coded star system did 
not transform eBay into an ICP with respect to the 
representations of the products on the auctioneer’s website, 
because eBay did not “create or develop” the underlying 
information of the products.148 In a similar fashion, the court in 
Carafano noted that when an Internet dating website 
“classifies user characteristics into discrete categories and 
collects responses to specific essay questions, [it] does not 
transform” the website into an ICP.149 The court in 
Roommates.com clarified their reasoning in Carafano, stating 
that the dating website at issue in Carafano was immune 
because the website operator did not contribute to the content’s 
illegality, thus it was not held liable as an ICP.150 Following 
this analysis, an important point in Rommates.com explained 
 
144. Id. at 1121. 
145. Id. (citing additional questions e-dating websites keep as optional to 
encourage sexually suggestive responses). 
146. See id. at 1124-25. 
147. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Ct. App. 2002). 
148. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25. 
149. See id. at 1124. 
150. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171-75 (9th Cir. 2003). The claim against the website 
was that it failed to review each user-created profile to ensure it was not 
defamatory. See id. This is the activity for which Congress established § 230, 
where the website operator was merely a passive conduit and thus could not 
be held liable for failing to detect and remove the false content. See id. In 
Carafano, the website operator had nothing to do with the user’s decision to 
enter a false name and create a fictitious profile, whereas Roommates.com 
developed and enforced a system that subjected subscribers to discriminatory 
housing practices. See id. 
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that “[t]he mere fact that an interactive computer service 
‘classifies user characteristics . . . does not transform [it] into a 
‘developer’ of the ‘underlying information.’’”151 
The underlying factual differences between Carafano and 
Roommates.com, were that the dating website in Carafano did 
nothing to enhance the defamatory message—it did not 
encourage defamation, nor did it make defamation easier.152 
The dating website simply provided neutral tools designed to 
match-up romantic partners based upon their voluntary 
inputs.153 In contrast, Roommates.com developed its website to 
force subscribers to divulge protected characteristics (protected 
by the Fair Housing Act) and discriminatory preferences, then 
matched-up potential roommates based upon criteria 
prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.154 Thus, the court in 
Roommates.com found the ISP also acted as an ICP for some of 
the online content, therefore, § 230 immunity was not 
applicable to part of the objectionable data.155 
 
2. The Second Leading Case – Craigslist 
 
In Craigslist, the court found that the defendant-ISP, 
Craigslist, was not liable for discriminatory housing 
advertisements posted by third-party users.156 However, the 
court made an important interpretation of § 230 by stating: 
“Subsection (c)(1) [of § 230] does not mention ‘immunity’ . . .” 
and that § 230 “as a whole cannot be understood as a general 
prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators and other 
online content hosts . . . .”157 Additionally, the court highlighted 
that § 230 could bar a defense if an ISP plays a more direct 
causal role in the creation or development of the objectionable 
 
151. Id. at 1172 (quoting Carfano, 339 F.3d at 1124). 
152. See id. at 1171-74 (distinguishing facts in instant case from facts in 
Carafano). 
153. See id. 
154. See id. at 1167. 
155. See id. at 1175.  
156. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008). 
157. Id. at 669. 
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content.158 Accordingly, the court in Craigslist highlights how a 
narrower application of § 230 immunity may be applied to 
future cases as the line between direct causation and ISP 
creation becomes less distinguished.159 
The court noted that § 230 is general and, when invoking a 
causation analysis, one must look at direct causation to 
objectionable content in determining if an ISP is also an ICP.160 
The court stated: 
 
Doubtless [C]raigslist plays a causal role in the 
sense that no one could post a discriminatory ad 
if craigslist did not offer a forum. That is not, 
however, a useful definition of cause. One might 
as well say that people who save money “cause” 
bank robbery, because if there were no banks 
there could be no bank robberies. An interactive 
computer service “causes” postings only in the 
sense of providing a place where people can post. 
Causation in a statute . . . must refer to causing 
a particular statement to be made, or perhaps 
the discriminatory content of a statement. That’s 
the sense in which a non-publisher can cause a 
discriminatory ad, while one who causes the 
forbidden content may not be a publisher. 
Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces 
anyone to post any particular listing or express a 
preference for discrimination; for example, 
craigslist does not offer a lower price to people 
who include discriminatory statements in their 
postings.161 
 
Finally, the court in Craigslist found that § 230 does not 
allow a party to “sue the messenger just because the message 
reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful 
 
158. See id. at 671. 
159. See id. at 671-72. 
160. See id. (explaining that Craigslist played a casual role in allowing a 
third-party to post objectionable content, but that this was not the type of 
causation which § 230 bars from immunity). 
161. Id. at 672. 
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discrimination”.162 Thus, the court noted that an ISP could fall 
outside of § 230 immunity if the ISP played a more direct 
casual role in the creation of the objectionable information.163 
 
B. Critical Analysis 
 
This Section will argue that the emerging trend of a 
narrower application of § 230 immunity is fully within the 
scope of the legislative purpose, findings, and policy of § 230. 
During the creation of § 230, the drafters of the provision, 
Representatives Cox and Wyden, stated that their goal was 
“‘relief . . . from the smut on the Internet’” and they intended to 
accomplish that goal by “‘empower[ing] parents without 
Federal regulation . . .’” to keep smut away from our 
children.164 “Representative Cox also stated that the Internet 
had ‘grown up to be what it is without . . . help from the 
government.’”165 Furthermore, as legal analysts note, the 
drafters of § 230 inserted the immunity provision to encourage 
ISPs to monitor and block “offensive” content when 
necessary.166 
Following the passage of § 230 by Congress, courts began 
interpreting the provision expansively due to the findings and 
policy subsections of § 230.167 The findings subsection 
highlighted that “‘the Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a 
minimum of government regulation.’”168 Additionally, the policy 
subsection of § 230 established that the purpose of § 230 is “‘to 
promote the continued development of the Internet’” and to 
“‘preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
 
162. Id. 
163. See id. at 671-72. 
164. See David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications 
Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 371, 372-79 (2010) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. 
Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden)). 
165. Lukmire, supra note 164, at 380 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H8470 
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden)). 
166. Id. at 381. 
167. Id. at 382. 
168. Id. at 382 (quoting § 230(a)(4)). 
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presently exists for the Internet . . . .’”169 Thus, courts have 
cited these finding and policy subsections of § 230 in applying 
broad immunity to ISPs.170 
Although courts have used the finding and policy 
subsections in applying § 230 immunity broadly, those same 
findings and policy objectives can still be realized when 
limiting the scope of § 230 immunity.171 When ISPs regulate in 
good faith, which was the purpose in creating § 230, a 
narrower-based immunity application still embodies this 
purpose by holding ISPs immune from liability when they 
choose to regulate. Accordingly, when ISPs do not act in a 
regulatory manner, but contribute to the creation or 
development of objectionable data, then the ISP may be 
considered “in whole or in part” an ICP.172 
Therefore, the policy and finding subsections of § 230 are 
still realized, because the Internet will remain a free and 
unburdened market for ISPs as long as their activities do not 
involve creation or development of objectionable data.173 
Additionally, today, an ISP is more likely to function as an ICP 
concerning user profile data, registration contingencies, and 
pre-populated questions and answers.174 This duality of 
ISP/ICP is apparent in the information digital age because a 
greater amount of data is being transmitted through ISPs, as 
ISPs are looking for more ways to generate revenue.175 Thus, 
the emerging trend of a narrower application § 230 immunity 
will likely continue in the future, as the Internet expands and 
ISPs further develop into ICPs.176 
One criticism of a narrower application of § 230 immunity 
is that online speech will be threatened and ISPs will 
undertake an unreasonable burden in determining what online 
 
169. Id. at 382 (quoting § 230(b)). 
170. Id. at 383-84. 
171. See generally Norby-Jahner, supra note 116, at 250-51. 
172. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008). 
173. See id. 
174. See Morley, supra note 107, at 8. 
175. See id. at 14. 
176. See id. at 14. 
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information is unlawful.177 However, this concern is partly 
addressed by the “Good Samaritan” exception which allows 
ISPs to voluntarily self-regulate without fear that their actions 
will offend freedom of speech online.178 Additionally, ISPs 
would not face any liability if the offensive data in question 
was provided by another ICP.179 However, if an ISP is in part 
responsible for the creation or development of the data, then 
liability may arise.180 The extent to this liability will vary, but 
the acknowledgment that liability may arise is narrowing the 
scope § 230.181 Thus, the new trend of limiting § 230 immunity 
denotes a changing online environment where ISPs may be 
accountable for their actions if they in whole or in part helped 
in creating or developing the offending content.182 
Another criticism of a narrower § 230 immunity is the 
disruption of the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions regarding third-party information.183 The logic 
behind such a broad application is that a narrower reading of § 
230 would frustrate the main objectives of § 230 by 
discouraging ISPs from voluntarily regulating third-party data 
on their websites.184 Critics claim that this would transform the 
Internet into an extremely sterile or highly polluted data 
medium, which is against the policies intended by § 230.185 
However, proponents for a narrower application note that 
when a website reposts a profile with slight modifications, it 
 
177. See Lukmire, supra note 164, at 388-89 (describing proponents’ 
argument for a broad application of § 230 immunity and the importance of 
keeping Internet traffic free from unreasonable interference from 
government). 
178. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). 
179. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that ISPs are completely 
protected under § 230 immunity if they remain an ISP and have not 
transformed into an ICP). 
180. Id. 
181. See Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). But see 
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670 (finding that § 230 immunity is not as broad as 
applied in Zeran and noting that an ISP may also be an ICP). 
182. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162. 
183. See id. at 1163. 
184. See id. at 1175. 
185. See id. 
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has generally been held that § 230 will provide immunity.186 An 
important question courts have asked when interpreting a 
narrower § 230 immunity is whether a minor alteration to a 
profile rises to the level of development necessary for 
liability.187 Thus, the answer to the question lies in applying a 
narrower application of immunity, by examining the amount of 
development the ISP engaged in and whether the ISP became 
part-ICP.188 
Generally, courts have found that when a party initiating a 
claim against a website for tortious acts, the hurdle in getting 
over § 230 immunity is transforming the ISP into an ICP.189 In 
Craigslist, the court explained that Craigslist could not be 
treated as speaker of a poster’s content.190 The court noted that 
in analyzing objectionable information, a court must keep in 
mind that “‘information’ is the stock in trade of ISPs” covering 
everything from “ads for housing . . . [to] biting comments 
about steroids in baseball . . .” and that ISPs will still be 
provided immunity under a stricter application of § 230 
immunity.191 
Additionally, causation regarding ISP liability requires a 
claim that a particular statement was made by the ISP or the 
discriminatory content of a statement was made by the ISP.192 
In that sense, a non-publisher can cause a discriminatory ad, 
while the forbidden content may be displayed by a publisher or 
a non-publisher.193 For example, if Craigslist were to offer a 
lower price to people who made discriminatory statements, 
then Craigslist may be liable as part-ICP and part-ISP.194 But, 
when an ISP is solely a messenger that reveals a third party’s 
plan to engage in unlawful discrimination or conduct, then § 
 
186. See id. at 1170. 
187. See id. at 1175 (finding importance in asking how much alteration 
to third-party content was performed by ISP in order for liability to attach). 
188. See id. at 1165. 
189. See id. at 1162-63. 
190. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008). 
191. See id. 
192. See id. 
193. See id. at 671-72. 
194. Id. at 672 (explaining example of Craigslist publishing illegal 
content, but in no way creating content, and thus did not turn into ICP). 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
ALTENBERGMACRO 29 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:06 AM 
952 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
230 provides immunity.195 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
In summary, this Comment presented an emerging trend 
of limiting the application of § 230 immunity and argued that 
this emerging trend is within the purpose and policy set-forth 
by Congress in passing § 230. First, the background of 
traditional and Internet intermediaries was presented to 
establish a general framework of intermediaries. Second, a 
brief discussion of the Constitutional framework concerning 
traditional intermediaries was presented to acknowledge that 
those concepts, established by the U.S. Supreme Court, are still 
relevant today. Third, § 230’s development, application, and 
discussion of the emerging trend in case law was presented to 
establish the conceptual and analytical framework in order to 
advance the emerging trend of a narrower application of § 230. 
Finally, the analysis of two defining cases representing the 
emerging trend were discussed, and the critical analysis of the 
emerging trend highlighted how a narrower application of § 
230 is within the purpose and policy set-forth by Congress in 
enacting § 230. 
In conclusion, today ISPs are limited in their ability to 
control the online environment they create or simply host.196 
Often, e-dating websites and social networking websites 
require members to verify certain information due to rising 
privacy and safety concerns.197 An example of one social 
networking website that has strictly enforced its verification 
policy is Whyville.198 Whyville requires children to pass a chat 
test and a license test before using the website.199 Another 
 
195. See id. at 671-72 (comparing phone companies and courier services 
to Craigslist as being a cause for discrimination in the sense that it was the 
messenger of discriminatory advertisements). 
196. See Hudson Jr., supra note 123, at 19 (describing online 
environment as a gossip haven with no privacy). 
197. See Norby-Jahner, supra note 116, at 260-62 (describing social 
networking websites taking proactive measures in ensuring user safety and 
content reliability). 
198. Id. at 261. 
199. Id. at 260-61 (describing some ISPs’ taking active measures in user 
information safety, reliability, and legitimacy). 
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example is the dating website Match.com, which now verifies 
that its members are not registered sex offenders.200 Thus, 
some ISPs have recognized a danger inherent on e-dating and 
social networking websites and have taken proactive measures. 
Whether § 230 needs to be revised or read more narrowly 
is a disputed subject.201 Many critics who oppose a narrow 
construction of § 230 claim that the Internet needs to remain a 
venue for the free exchange of all ideas.202 However, the 
emerging trend of a narrower § 230 immunity suggests that 
ISPs are not going to be given unchecked powers.203 The 
emerging trend of narrower § 230 immunity remains a 
controversial issue.204 The terms “creation” and “development” 
in categorizing an ISP as an ICP will take on further meaning 
as courts analyze the evolving environment of Internet 
intermediaries.205 
Accordingly, as the evolving analysis of ISP and ICP 
categorizations develop, many supporters of a “broad blanket” 
application of § 230 argue that doctrinal protections raise First 
Amendment issues.206 But critics to this view note that the 
free-wheeling landscape of § 230 immunity needs to come to an 
end due to an increasing potential for abuse and fraud 
online.207 Many courts have stated that § 230 was not intended 
to create a “lawless no man’s land on the Internet”208 nor is it a 
“general prohibition of civil liability for [ISPs and ICPs] . . . .”209 
 
200. Eyder Peralta, Dating Site Match.com Will Now Check Users 
Against Sex Offender Database, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO NEWS (Apr. 18, 2011, 
1:58 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/04/18/135514625/dating-
site-match-com-will-now-check-users-against-sex-offender-database. 
201. See Lukmire, supra note 164, at 410-11 (describing tension between 
advocates for broad and narrow § 230 immunity). 
202. See id. at 404-10. 
203. See id. at 406-10. 
204. See Morley, supra note 107, at 13-16. 
205. See id. at 14-15 (citing cases that limited § 230 immunity by 
analyzing whether ISP created, encouraged, or developed objectionable 
content, thus turning ISP into ICP). 
206. See id. at 13 (finding supporters of broad § 230 immunity-based 
argument on constitutional rights). 
207. See id. at 13-14. 
208. Id. at 14 (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
209. Id. at 14 (quoting Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/8
ALTENBERGMACRO 29 PAGES 11/13/2012 9:06 AM 
954 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
Therefore, the development of mixed use content analysis and 
encouragement of illegal use content analysis provides a 
glimpse of how § 230 might be applied in the coming decade.210 
Today, as more data and information develops on the 
Internet, the issues of reliability, safety, and illegality 
concerning e-dating will advance the trend of a narrower § 230 
immunity application.211 Whether more fluid definitions of 
creation and development are applied or a strict categorical 
approach is adopted, the reach of § 230 seems to be taking a 
new turn in the ever-evolving Internet law landscape.212 
 
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
210. See id. at 14-15 (finding supporting evidence through case law that 
new categories of limiting § 230 immunity is emerging). 
211. See supra nn. 103-42 and accompanying text (describing shift of 
analysis to scrutinize ISPs who also conduct themselves as ICPs). 
212. See supra nn. 103-47 and accompanying text (explaining new 
categories have emerged in analyzing whether § 230 immunity applies and 
applying heightened scrutiny to cases where ISP may also be ICP concerning 
objectionable information). 
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